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Abstract 
“Librarians wanted - applicants must be over six feet tall” is a subtle way of achieving a discriminatory goal. 
Since the seminal case of Griggs v Duke Power,* decided by a unanimous Supreme Court in 1971, the United 
States judiciary has, using disparate impact theory, recognised such cases as legally actionable. Case law also 
recognised some (but not all) discriminatory subjective hiring practices (such as excessive discretion given to 
one manager), but stopped short, in Wards Cove v Atonio,** of recognising “plantation economy” cases, where 
there is a racially stratified workforce with no identified specific cause. 
In the meantime, the British Parliament followed Griggs by outlawing indirect discrimination in the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 and the Race Relations Act 1976. However, after some deference to the spirit of Griggs 
in the early years, the British judiciary gave the statutory definition the narrowest interpretation. So much so, 
that in recent years, a new statutory definition was introduced to reverse the effect of these cases. In liberalising 
the law, the new definition opens the way to challenge subjective hiring practices, and possibly the plantation 
economy cases that were rejected in Wards Cove. For the first time British anti-discrimination law has the 
opportunity of advancing on its American model. Central to this is overcoming the objections made in Wards 
Cove. The underlying and surviving reasoning of the Wards Cove decision is that to recognise these cases would 
force employers to adopt quotas. This paper will show that all discriminatory subjective hiring practices should 
be actionable and that the Wards Cove quota reasoning is technically flawed and a fiction. Further, it will 
demonstrate positive reasons why plantation economy cases should be recognised. 
* 401 US 424 (1971). 
** 490 US 642 (1989). 
Keywords: Disparate Impact/Indirect Discrimination, Plantation Economies, Quota Fear, Subjective Hiring 
Practices, New Definitions of Disparate Impact, Wards Cove v Atonio, Griggs v Duke Powe, Perera v Civil 
Service Commission. 
Introduction 
The European Union has forced Britain to introduce 
a more liberal definition of indirect discrimination 
law, giving the judiciary more scope for 
interpretation. United States judges have been 
interpreting an open-ended definition since 1964. 
This paper explores the possibilities of the new 
British definition by reviewing the American 
experience.  
In 1971, the Supreme Court, in Griggs v Duke 
Power Co,1 outlawed indirect discrimination by 
developing disparate impact theory. Title VII, Civil 
Rights Act 1964, provides:2 
“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual ... because of 
                                                          
1 401 US 424 (1971). 
2 Section 703(a) (codified as 42 USCS s. 2000e-2). 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin...” 
Duke Power’s Station in North Carolina was 
divided into five departments: Labor, Coal 
Handling, Operations, Maintenance, and Laboratory 
and Test. Work in the Labor Department was the 
dirtiest and lowest paid. A high school diploma 
and/or the passing of an intelligence test was 
necessary to gain employment in, or promotion to, 
any of the four other Departments. Duke Power 
employed 95 workers at the Station, 14 of whom 
were African-Americans. All 14 African-Americans 
were employed in the Labor Department. Statistics 
revealed that 34 per cent of whites completed high 
school, in contrast to 12 per cent of African-
Americans. Research showed that 58 per cent of 
whites, in contrast to six per cent of African-
Americans, passed the Intelligence Tests used by 
Duke Power. Duke Power showed they had not 
intended that the requirements would discriminate, 
but failed to show that the requirements were related 
to job performance. The Supreme Court found Duke 
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Power liable under Title VII and gave its reasoning 
this short, classic, paragraph: 
“Congress has now provided that tests or criteria 
for employment or promotion may not provide 
equality of opportunity merely in the sense of the 
fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox. On the 
contrary, Congress has now required that the posture 
and condition of the job-seeker be taken into 
account. It has - to resort again to the fable - 
provided that the vessel in which the milk is 
proffered be one all seekers can use. The Act 
proscribes not only overt discrimination but also 
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in 
operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an 
employment practice which operates to exclude 
[African-Americans] cannot be shown to be related 
to job performance, the practice is prohibited.”3 
It can be seen that this disparate impact theory has 
two broad limbs. First, the plaintiff identifies a 
disparate impact upon his or her racial group, caused 
by the defendant. The defendant then has the 
opportunity to “justify” that disparity with matters 
related to job necessity.  
However, the certainty of this theory was disturbed 
by the 1989 case, Wards Cove v Atonio,4 and the 
legislation that followed. Wards Cove ran salmon 
canneries in Alaska where skilled (mainly white) 
and unskilled (mainly Filipino or native Alaskan) 
workers were divided by separate accommodation, 
dining halls and pay. A class of non-white unskilled 
workers brought a case - heavily based on statistical 
evidence - of disparate impact. A bare majority of 
the Supreme Court rejected the claim.  
The majority held that a plaintiff had to isolate 
each specific, identifiable employment practice that 
caused a disparate impact. They also rejected the 
plaintiff’s “in-house” statistics, stating that the 
proper comparison was between the at-issue jobs 
(the skilled jobs) and the relevant labour market. For 
this and other reasons, the decision caused uproar 
and confusion, leaving Congress to clarify the law. 
The problem for Congressional reform was summed 
up by White, J, who stated that an alternative result 
would mean that any employer with a racially 
imbalanced workforce could be “haled into court” to 
justify to the situation.5 The alternative was to hire 
in quotas. Congress passed section 105 of the Civil 
Rights Act 1991, which provided that:  
“...the complaining party shall demonstrate that each 
particular challenged employment practice causes a 
disparate impact...” 
 
This Follows the Wards Cove Line. However, the 
Reform came with the Exception 
                                                          
3 Per Berger, CJ, 401 US 424, at 434. 
4 490 US 642 (1989). 
5 Ibid., at 652. 
“...if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court 
that the elements of a respondent’s decisionmaking [sic] 
process are not capable of separation for analysis, the 
decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one 
employment practice.”6 
 
The Legislative History was Restricted to Just One 
Statement 
“When a decision-making process includes particular, 
functionally-integrated practices which are components 
of the same criterion, standard, method of administration, 
or test, such as the height and weight requirements 
designed to measure strength in Dothard v Rawlinson7 
the particular, functionally-integrated practices may be 
analysed as one employment practice”8 
 
The requirements in Dothard v Rawlinson were 
designed to measure the strength of prison officer 
applicants, but discriminated against women. 
According to the exception, these requirements 
could not be separated for analysis and so could be 
taken as a whole when linking them to the disparate 
impact upon women. The Wards Cove ruling on the 
comparison was left unaffected by Congress. 
In the meantime, Britain suffered under an even 
more restrictive definition. Section 1 of the Race 
Relations Act 1976 (RRA 1976) provided: 
“(1) (b) A person discriminates against another...if-... 
(b) he applies to that other a requirement or condition 
which he applies or would apply equally to persons not 
of the same racial group as that other but-  
(i) which is such that the proportion of persons of that 
same racial group who can comply with it is 
considerably smaller than the proportion of persons not 
of that racial group who can comply with it, and  
(ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable...”9 
 
The key phrase here is “requirement or condition.” 
In Perera v Civil Service Commission,10 the Court of 
Appeal held that the formula could apply only to 
discriminatory measures that amounted to absolute 
barriers to a job, rather than “mere preferences” that 
put people at a disadvantage, because of race or sex. 
So, a job advertisement reading “applicants over six 
feet tall would be preferred” would fall outside of 
the legislation, under this interpretation.11 Only if the 
                                                          
6 42 USCS s. 2000e-2(k) (1)(B)(i). The majority’s opinion on 
justification was reversed by the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which 
restored the law to the pre-Wards Cove position. See 42 USCS s. 
2000e-2, (k)(1)(A)(i). 
7 433 US 321 (1977). 
8 Per Sen Danforth, 137 Cong Rec S15276 (daily ed Oct 25, 
1991). 
9 Section 1(1)(b), sex Discrimination Act 1975 is materially the 
same. 
10 [1983] ICR 428 CA. Followed in Meer v London Borough of 
Tower Hamlets[1988] IRLR 399, CA. 
11 Contrast the Australian case, Styles (1989) 88 ALR 621. Of 
course, it was open to the Court of Appeal to hold that such 
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preference were elevated to a requirement 
(“applicants must be over six feet tall”) would the 
Act apply.  
However, Britain was forced by successive 
European Directives12 to liberalise the formula. The 
new definition reads: 
“A person ... discriminates against another if ... he 
applies to that other a provision, criterion or practice 
which he applies or would apply equally to persons 
not of the same race or ethnic or national origins as 
that other, but 
1. which puts or would put persons of the same 
race or ethnic or national origins as that other at 
a particular disadvantage when compared with 
other persons, 
2. which puts that other at a disadvantage, and 
3. which he cannot show to be a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim.”13 
 
By replacing the phrase “requirement or condition” 
with “provision, criterion or practice” the new 
definition is open to many more types of indirect 
discrimination. It may even have potential beyond 
its (reformed) American counterpart. 
For the present purposes, disparate impact cases 
may be divided into three classes. (1) Subjective 
hiring practices, such as excessive discretion 
conferred upon one person, say a foreman, which 
perpetuates a workplace situation, eg racially 
imbalanced workforce. (2) “Plantation economy” 
cases, where there is a racially stratified workforce 
with no identified specific cause. (3) A neutral 
requirement, such as the tests in Griggs. This third 
class of cases is challengeable under both US and 
UK legislation. Whether or not the first two classes 
are challengeable demands further inquiry. 
Subjective Hiring Practices 
Normally, subjective hiring practices have been 
actionable in the United States. For example, in 
Rowe v General Motors,14 production line staff were 
hourly paid whilst foremen and management were 
salaried. To be promoted from the production a 
worker line either needed to have the foreman’s 
recommendation, or take the initiative in the hope 
that there was a vacancy at the time. The Court 
identified the following features:15 
                                                                                      
preferences were in fact “requirements to gain an advantage.” For 
other arguments suggesting that Perera was incorrectly decided 
see, Connolly, M, “Discrimination law: requirements and 
preferences,” [1998] Industrial Law Journal 133. 
12 Burden of Proof Directive, Council Directive 97/80/EC (sex); 
Race Directive, Council Directive 2000/43/EC. 
13 Section 1(1A), RRA 1976; Section 1(1A), SDA 1975 is 
materially the same. In force (RRA) 19 July 2003, (SDA) 12 
October 2001. 
14 457 F 2d 348 (1972) (CA 5th). See also, Montana Rail Link v 
Byard 260 Mont 331 (1993) (Supreme Court of Montana). 
15 Ibid, at 358-359. 
1. The foreman’s recommendation (in either case) 
was vital. 
2. The foreman was given no written instructions 
regarding qualifications necessary for 
promotion. 
3. His criteria used were vague and subjective: 
“ability, merit, capacity, experience, attendance, 
and medical and disciplinary records.” In fact, 
the records were never checked. Seniority was 
not a factor. 
4. Hourly employees were not notified of 
promotion opportunities or the qualifications 
necessary to get jobs. 
5. There were no safeguards in this “procedure” 
designed to avert discriminatory practices.  
It was held that this “procedure” amounted to an 
employment practice within Title VII, and that it 
discriminated against African-Americans, who 
occupied predominantly the hourly jobs.  
A more recent and prominent example arose in the 
Supreme Court in Watson v Fort Worth Bank and 
Trust,16 where the African-American applicant was 
rejected for promotion to supervisory positions in 
the bank. The employers had no formal criteria for 
the position, but relied on the subjective judgment of 
white supervisors. It was held that the doctrine of 
disparate impact could be applied to challenge such 
a subjective procedure. O’Connor, J stated:17  
“We are also persuaded that disparate impact analysis is 
in principle no less applicable to subjective employment 
criteria than to objective or standardised tests. In either 
case, a facially neutral practice, adopted without 
discriminatory intent, may have effects that are 
indistinguishable from intentionally discriminatory 
practices ...” 
 
The question now is whether these claims would 
survive the reforms in the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 
Clearly it would be very difficult - if not impossible 
- for the plaintiffs in Rowe to prove each criterion 
caused a disparate impact. Presumably, a court 
would hold that they were “functionally-integrated 
practices” and so may be analysed as one 
employment practice, under section 105’s exception. 
An example arising after the Act is Butler v Home 
Depot18 where “sociological and anecdotal” 
evidence showed that a male culture dominated the 
working environment and allowed stereotypes about 
women to prevail. For the selection and promotion 
of staff there was a near total absence of specific 
criteria, no written guidelines, no jobs advertised, no 
formal procedure for discovering vacancies and no 
reasons given for promotion decisions. The Court 
                                                          
16 487 US 977 (1988), US Supreme Court. 
17 Ibid, at 989-991. 
18 1997 US Dist LEXIS 16296 District Court for the Northern 
District of California.  
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held that the defendant’s recruitment and promotion 
practices could be analysed as a whole.19  
However, it would seem that there is a sub-class of 
cases that are not actionable. The common feature in 
these cases is that the employer merely acquiesced 
in the informal procedures. In Ballor v Alcona 
County Road Commission20 the plaintiff complained 
that the word-of-mouth and walk-in recruitment 
practices of the defendant had a disparate impact 
upon women. The defendant did not positively 
encourage this “system.” It was held that this non-
action - cast by the court as the plaintiff’s “failure-
to-recruit theory” - did not amount to a “practice” 
under disparate impact theory.21 The Court relied on 
EEOC v Chicago Miniature Lamp Works,22 where it 
was held that if an employer did not actively 
encourage word-of-mouth recruitment, it was not 
possible to identify a specific employment practice 
as causing adverse impact.23 
Ballor and Chicago Miniature Lamp Works are 
suspect because there seems to be no reason or 
principle why an employer’s acquiescence in 
discrimination should be lawful. After all, on general 
tortious principles, an omission amounts to an act. 
This also sidesteps any notion of vicariously 
liability. (Why should not an employer be liable for 
a discriminatory practice operated by his worker?) If 
a particular culture dominates the working 
environment, that culture will prevail in recruitment, 
unless some active steps are taken to counter it. To 
distinguish cases purely on the ground that in one, 
the employer instructed staff to discriminate, whilst 
in the other, he sat back and observed his staff do it, 
must be against the policy of the legislation and 
brings the law into disrepute. Further, it goes 
dangerously close to suggesting that liability is fault-
based, which it is not.24 In any case, it is 
inconceivable that nowadays an employer would be 
unaware that an informal recruitment policy would, 
at the least, perpetuate the status quo, and most 
                                                          
19 See also Stender v Lucky Stores 803 F Supp 259 (1992) 
(District Court for the Northern District of California) where the 
employment practice was held to be a “lack of uniform criteria, 
criteria that were subjective as well as variable, discretionary 
placements and promotions, a failure to follow set procedures and 
the absence of written policies or justifications for promotional 
decisions.” In Caron v Scott Paper 834 F Supp 33 (1993) (District 
Court for the District of Maine) the employment practice 
consisted of the subjective factors of: “job skills, leading change 
skills, interpersonal skills, self-management, performance, and 
versatility,” and the objective factor of “length of service.”  
20 No 95-CV-10366-BC (1997) US Dist LEXIS 4337 (US District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Northern Division). 
Affirmed 145 F.3d 1329. 
21 Ibid, at 37. 
22 Equal Employment Opportunities Commission v Chicago 
Miniature Lamp Works 947 F 2d 292, at 288-89 (CA 7th Cir 
1991) 
23 Chicago Miniature was distinguished in Byard v Montana Rail 
Link because that in Byard the employer was the “impetus” 
behind the “word-of-mouth” recruitment, whereas in Chicago 
Miniature it was “employee initiated”: 260 Mont, 331 at 352. 
24 Griggs v Duke Power 401 US 424 (1971). 
likely, discriminate against groups underrepresented 
in the workplace. 
Until recently most subjective employment 
practices were lawful under Britain’s discrimination 
law because such nebulous criteria rarely amounted 
to an absolute bar, or “requirement.” For instance, in 
Perera v Civil Service Commission,25 the Court of 
Appeal rejected Mr Perera’s argument that several 
“preferences” (good command of the English 
language, experience in the UK and British 
nationality) that could not be complied with, added 
up to an absolute bar to many of those, like Mr 
Perera, of Sri Lankan origin. However, under the 
new definition, “provision, criterion or practice,” 
subjective practices should be challengeable, 
especially free from any stricture resembling section 
105, Civil Rights Act 1991. However, there are two 
areas that require clarification. First, the practice 
must cause a “particular disadvantage” (emphasis 
supplied). But this is quite different from demanding 
that each practice is isolated. A claimant should be 
able to establish that several criteria (amounting to a 
single practice) caused a particular disadvantage to 
her group. 
The second issue is whether the formula covers 
“acquiescence” cases, such as Ballor and Chicago 
Miniature. The only similar British case arose Pel 
Ltd v Modgill,26 a claim of direct discrimination 
(disparate treatment) under section 1(2), RRA 1976, 
which provides that “segregating a person from 
other persons on grounds of race is treating him less 
favourably than they are treated.” In this case a paint 
shop in a factory was staffed solely by Asians. 
Originally, there had been white workers there as 
well. However, over the years as vacancies arose 
they were filled by friends or relatives of the Asians 
through word of mouth; the personnel department 
did no recruiting. The paint spray work was the 
dirtiest in the factory and the Asians complained 
alleging segregation. Slynn, J rejected the claim, 
stating: 
“...had there been evidence of a policy to segregate, and 
of the fact of segregation arising as a result of the 
company’s acts, that might have well constituted a 
breach of the legislation....We do not consider that the 
failure of the company to intervene and to assist on white 
or non-Asian workers going into to the shop, contrary to 
the wishes of the men to introduce their friends, itself 
constituted an act of segregating...”27 
 
Slynn, J is saying, in effect, that there must be a 
positive act of segregation by the defendant, to fall 
within the definition given by section 1(2), RRA 
1976. In this case, as in Ballor and Chicago 
Miniature, the employer merely acquiesced in the 
                                                          
25 [1983] ICR 428 CA. Followed in Meer v London Borough of 
Tower Hamlets[1988] IRLR 399, CA. 
26 [1980] IRLR 142 EAT. 
27  Ibid, at para 40. 
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discriminatory practice. But there are doubts over 
the correctness of such a decision under the British 
legislation. First section 78, RRA 1976,28 provides 
that, for the purposes of the RRA, an act includes a 
deliberate omission. Second, this was a case of 
direct discrimination arising before it was settled 
that discriminatory intent was not an element of 
direct discrimination.29 As discriminatory intent 
never has been an element of indirect discrimination, 
a fortiori Pel v Modgill should carry no authority in 
such cases. At the least, an employer who was aware 
of the challenged practice should be liable for a 
“deliberate omission.” It would very difficult for an 
employer, who say, operated no recruitment 
procedure, to deny awareness of how his workers 
were recruited. Thus, under the new definition of 
indirect discrimination,  “acquiescence” cases 
should succeed in Britain. 
The Plantation Economy Cases 
The features of these cases are “in-house” statistics 
revealing a significant disparity in the workforce, 
and no identified specific employment practice 
causing the disparity. A conspicuous case here is 
Wards Cove Packing Co v Atonio.30 In Wards Cove 
it will be recalled, the workforce was divided along 
racial lines in skills, accommodation, and pay. In his 
dissent, Stevens, J made this vivid observation: 
“... some characteristics of the Alaska salmon industry 
described in this litigation ... - in particular, the 
segregation of housing and dining facilities and the 
stratification of jobs along racial and ethnic lines - bear 
an unsettling resemblance to aspects of a plantation 
economy.” 
 
The difficulty was that although the situation 
appears repugnant to modern civilization, the 
plaintiffs could not isolate particular practices that 
caused the disparity. The scenario alone was not 
enough for the majority, who reasoned that a 
decision in favour of the plaintiffs: 
“... would mean that any employer who had a segment of 
his work force that was - for some reason - racially 
imbalanced, could be haled into court and forced to 
engage in the expensive and time-consuming task of 
[justification] ... The only practicable option for many 
employers would be to adopt racial quotas ... “31 and “... 
would result in employers being potentially liable for 
                                                          
28 This is consistent throughout the legislation: SDA 1975, s 
82(1); Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 
2003, SI 2003/1660, reg 2(3); Employment Equality (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1661, reg 2(3); Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995, s 68(1). 
29 See R. v Birmingham City Council ex parte EOC [1989] AC 1155 
HL, and James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] AC 751, HL. 
30 490 US 642 (1989). 
31 Ibid, at 652. 
‘the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical 
imbalances in the composition of their work forces.’”32 
 
Of course, the reasoning is based on the fear of 
quotas.33 Before discussing the fundamental 
objection to the quota fear, it is helpful to consider 
two technical aspects of the majority’s decision: (1) 
the need to identify a specific causal employment 
practice and (2) the rejection of the plaintiff’s  “in-
house” statistics for the comparison. 
Specific Identifiable Practice 
The majority demanded that a plaintiff must identify 
a specific employment practice that caused the 
disparate impact. The problem with this strict 
approach is that it is based on the notion that this 
element serves to prevent quotas. It does not. This 
can be illustrated by envisaging a crude - or “fair-
share” - theory,34 that wherever there was a racial 
imbalance, a successful disparate impact claim 
would follow. That would drive employers to adopt 
quotas. The element missing from this notion is 
“justification.” We know that justification can show 
how far the employer’s practice is job-related. What 
is less obvious is that it can show, in addition, 
whether the cause is within or without the 
employer’s control, or a proportion of each. For 
instance, in Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority,35 
the defendant employer was trying to justify a 40 per 
cent difference in pay between speech therapists (98 
per cent female) and pharmacists (63 per cent 
female). As women were over-represented in the 
lower paid group, this was a prime facie case of 
indirect sex discrimination, which the employer was 
burdened to justify. The employer argued that 
market forces caused the difference, although their 
evidence revealed that only an extra 10 per cent pay 
was needed to recruit a sufficient number of 
pharmacists. Thus, there existed a less 
discriminatory alternative of paying the pharmacists 
                                                          
32 490 US 642, at 657. Citing Watson v Fort Worth Bank & Trust 
487 US 977, at 992. 
33 S 703(j), Civil Rights Act 1964, provides: “Nothing contained 
in [Title VII] shall be interpreted to require any employer  ... to 
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group 
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such 
individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist 
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any 
race [etc] ... employed by any employer ... in comparison with the 
total number or percentage of persons of such race [etc] ... in any 
community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work 
force in any community, State, section, or other area. 42 USCS s. 
2000e-2(j). See also Albemarle Paper Co v Moody 422 US 405, at 
449 (Blackmun, J, concurring in judgment) (1975). 
34 See Carvin, M, “Disparate Impact Claims Under the New Title 
VII” 68 Notra Dame Law Rev 1153, who calls this a “pure” 
standard, at 1154. See also Lustgarten, L, Legal Control of Racial 
Discrimination, 1980, London: Macmillan Press, who names this 
“unalloyed” in contrast to the “compromised” statutory theory, at 
p 54. 
35 [1994] 1 All ER 495 ECJ. 
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a 10 per cent premium. The European Court of 
Justice stated:  
“If...the National Court has been able to determine 
precisely what proportion of the increase in pay is 
attributable to market forces, it must necessarily accept 
that that the pay differential is objectively justified to the 
extent of that proportion.”36 
 
The point is that in every case there will be a cause 
of a proven disparate impact. It will be either the 
employment practice or something outside the 
control of the employer (say, the skills of the 
respective racial/gender groups in the labour 
market), or a proportion of each. In Enderby, the 
shortage of female pharmacists caused some of the 
disparate impact, whilst employer discrimination 
caused the rest. Here justification not only exempted 
the employer from liability for causes beyond its 
control, it also identified the causes of all the 
disparate impact. If this approach were adopted for 
plantation economy cases, the issue would not be 
whether or not there should exist an employment 
practice, but rather, upon whom is the burden of 
identifying it, which is a very different question, to 
which we will return presently.  
The Comparison 
The Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co v 
Atonio37 emphasised that the usual comparison to be 
made is between the racial make-up of the at-issue 
(ie skilled) jobs and the racial make-up of the 
qualified persons in the labour market.38 
Alternatively, where labour market statistics are 
unavailable, statistics indicating the racial 
composition of otherwise-qualified applicants for the 
at-issue jobs could be used.39 However, this 
“applicant comparison” has been commonly used, 
especially where tests are alleged to have a 
discriminatory impact.40 In the sex discrimination 
case Dothard v Rawlinson41 a comparison between 
men and women of the general population was used, 
although that was a highly unusual case where 
height and weight requirements were likely to 
discriminate against women in any section of the 
workforce, nation-wide. 
The type of comparison used by the plaintiff was a 
major issue in the Wards Cove case. The plaintiffs 
argued that a prima facie case of disparate impact 
was made out with statistics showing a high 
                                                          
36 Ibid, at para 27. 
37 490 US 642 (1989). 
38 490 US 642, at 650 - 651. 
39 Eg New York City Transit Authority v Beazer 440 US 568, at 
585 (1979): Malave v Potter 320 F.3d 321, at 326-328 (2003). 
40 See eg, Bushey v New York State Civil Service Commission 733 
F 2d 220 (1984) Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, cert 
denied, 469 US 1117 (1985); and Bridgeport Guardians v City of 
Bridgeport 933 F 2d 1140 (1991), Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit. 
41 433 US 321, at 329-330. 
percentage of non-white (Filipino and native 
Alaskan) workers in the cannery (non-skilled) jobs 
and a low percentage of non-whites in the non-
cannery (generally skilled) positions. The majority 
rejected this approach, holding that the proper 
comparison was between the workforce and the 
relevant labour market. In addition to the quota fear, 
the majority reasoned an employer would be forced 
to defend a situation caused by the dearth of skilled 
non-white applicants, something which is not the 
employer’s fault.42 This part of Wards Cove was left 
untouched by the 1991 Civil Rights Act. There are 
two technical problems with this particular ruling: (i) 
fault-based liability and (ii) the rejection of “in-
house” statistics. 
(i) Employer’s “Fault” 
When discussing the type of comparison to make 
White, J supported the majority view by stating: 
“If the absence of minorities holding such skilled 
positions is due to a dearth of qualified nonwhite 
applicants (for reasons that are not petitioners’ fault), 
petitioners’ selection methods or employment practices 
cannot be said to have had a ‘disparate impact’ on 
nonwhites.”43 
 
In his dissent Stevens, J reminded the majority that 
any fault by the employer was irrelevant for liability: 
“This statement distorts the disparate-impact theory, in 
which the critical inquiry is whether an employer’s 
practices operate to discriminate. Eg, Griggs, 401 US, at 
431. Whether the employer intended such discrimination 
is irrelevant.”44 
 
This is an accurate criticism, but it does not extend 
to the true problem. First, Stevens, J is correct in 
saying that whether the cause of discrimination is 
“innocent,” or whether the employer is at “fault,” is 
irrelevant to liability. However, the true problem can 
be illuminated by recalling Griggs. The Court in 
Wards Cove overlooked a strikingly similar feature 
common to Wards Cove and Griggs. 
In Griggs the use of intelligence tests 
discriminated against African-Americans because, as 
African-Americans, they had “long received inferior 
education in segregated schools.”45 This of course, 
was not the fault of Duke Power. It was held that the 
tests caused discrimination. So, in both Griggs and 
Wards Cove the shortage of “qualified” persons was 
not the fault of the defendant employer. Yet in 
                                                          
42 490 US 642, at 652.   
43 Ibid. A similar sentiment was expressed in the context of 
identifiable practice where White, J feared for “employers being 
potentially liable for ‘the myriad of innocent causes that may lead 
to statistical imbalances in the composition of their work forces.’” 
(Emphasis supplied. Ibid. at 657.) 
44 490 US 642, at 678. 
45 401 US 424, at 430. 
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Griggs it was not an issue whilst the Court in Wards 
Cove made it one. To take an extreme case, blaming 
the racial imbalance on the job market was rather 
like blaming the impact on women of the height and 
weight requirements in Dothard v Rawlinson46 on 
evolution. 
The Rejection of “In-House” Statistics 
A connected reason for rejecting a comparison 
between members of the workforce was that 
otherwise an employer would be driven to adopt 
quotas by the fear of being “haled into court” to 
justify the situation.47 This reasoning is undermined 
by a number of factors.  
First, it assumes that the only alternative to the 
plantation economy situation is quotas. This is 
mistaken. Another option is to trace the causes of the 
disparity. As seen above, this can be achieved when 
an employer is compelled to justify the situation.48 
There are many benefits of this approach. Among 
them is that the causes of the stratification will be 
traced. Whatever part is within the control of the 
employer should be solved fairly quickly. Causes 
beyond the employer’s control will at least be 
identified and then can enter the political arena for 
possible solutions. Skills shortages, or education 
deficiencies, peculiar to a particular group, are two 
examples.  
Another factor undermining the majority’s 
reasoning is that it is based on the notion that doing 
nothing is lawful. Most would agree that employers 
are under a moral positive duty to ensure that their 
business practices are not discriminatory. But the 
majority’s reasoning assumes that this does not 
extend to a legal duty. It has already been argued 
that this is wrong in relation to acquiescing in 
subjective hiring practices. But the perversity of the 
reasoning can be illustrated by considering again 
Griggs v Duke Power.49  
In Griggs, the only evidence of discrimination 
before the eyes of the employer was the racial 
imbalance of the workforce: African-Americans in 
the dirty, low paid, outdoor jobs, whilst whites 
occupied the indoor, higher-wage jobs. If the 
employer had acted on this, it may have traced the 
problem to the educational requirements and tests, 
considered their necessity for the job, and 
abandoned them. Expensive litigation would have 
been avoided. Duke Power would not have been 
“haled into court” or forced to adopt quotas, as 
White, J suggested. Any employer with a racially 
imbalanced workforce will either change the 
culpable practice or justify the situation. In the first 
case there will be no litigation. In the second, any 
                                                          
46 433 US 321 (1977). 
47 490 US 642, at 651. 
48 See eg Enderby v Frenchay HA [1994] 1 All ER 495 ECJ, 
discussed above. 
49 401 US 424 (1971). 
litigation would be succinct. This is because the only 
issue would be justification, (the employer having 
already recognised a prima facie case to justify). The 
perversity - or perhaps, irony - of the Wards Cove 
decision, is that by encouraging employers to ignore 
the signs of discrimination, it will lead to more 
litigation. 
The majority decision is further undermined if the 
case is compared with Griggs in more detail. What 
the whole court in Wards Cove overlooked was that 
the comparisons made in Griggs and Wards Cove 
were the same. In both cases the comparison made 
was based upon the racial composition of the 
existing workforce.50 In both cases no comparison 
was made between the racial composition of the at-
issue jobs and that of the qualified population in the 
labour market (the “proper” comparison according 
to the Court in Wards Cove).51 However, in each 
case the Court presumed that - with this comparison 
- there was no significant disparity.52  
So is it possible to distinguish Wards Cove from 
Griggs? The answer is yes, but in form rather than 
substance. In Griggs evidence additional to the 
comparison was presented. The Court noted that in 
North Carolina, 1960 census statistics show that, 
while 34 per cent of white males had completed high 
school, only 12 per cent of African-American males 
had done so. Regarding the tests, the Equal 
Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) in 
one case found that use of a battery of tests, 
including the two tests used in Griggs, resulted in 58 
per cent of whites passing the tests, as compared 
with only six per cent of African-Americans.53 This 
“external” evidence, combined with the comparison, 
was the basis of Mr Griggs’ prima facie case. 
There was no “external” evidence of that type in 
Wards Cove. But there was evidence additional to 
the comparison. First, Wards Cove Packing recruited 
its skilled workers using its offices in Washington 
and Oregon.54 This hiring practice had no 
relationship to any particular required skill. Second, 
the skilled and unskilled workers were 
                                                          
50 The Court in Griggs noted that out of 95 employees at Duke 
Power, fourteen were black, all of who worked in the lowest paid 
labour department. (At 426-427.) It seems to be a common 
misconception that in Griggs the comparison was made between 
the applicants. This probably stems from the evidence that blacks 
were less likely to have a high school diploma and would perform 
less well in the tests. What seems to have been overlooked is that 
this evidence was purely external, and was in no way based upon 
the qualifications or test performances of Duke Power’s 
employees or applicants. 
51 490 U.S. 642, at 650.  
52 In Griggs, it was implicitly accepted when Burger, CJ stated 
“Because they are [Blacks], petitioners have long received 
inferior education in segregated schools...” (at 430) and in Wards 
Cove when White, J talked about the “dearth of qualified 
nonwhite applicants” (at 652). 
53 401 US 424, at 431, citing CCH Empl Prac Guide, para 
17,304.53 (Dec 2nd, 1966). 
54 Note that in US v Georgia Power 474 F 2d 906 (5th Cir 1973), 
recruitment from predominantly white educational institutions 
was held to a violation of Title VII (at 926). 
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accommodated in separate dormitories and mess 
halls - a practice likely to reinforce any racial 
disparities. Third, many unskilled workers testified 
that they actually possessed the necessary skills to 
fill some of the skilled jobs.55 Fourth, there was no 
promotion from the unskilled to the skilled 
positions; all skilled jobs were filled solely through 
the Washington and Oregon offices. The majority 
simply ignored this evidence. Yet this evidence was 
substantial. First, overall, it was practically 
impossible that native Alaskans or Filipinos would 
be recruited into the skilled jobs and absolutely 
impossible for a member of the unskilled workforce 
(nearly all Alaskan or Filipino) to obtain promotion. 
Second, in any case, it did not need to be the sole 
basis of a prima facie case; it was only necessary to 
use it in combination with the comparison of the 
workforce. Third, it was no less substantial than the 
additional evidence used in Griggs. (If anything the 
“vivid” evidence was much more telling.) In Griggs 
the evidence relating to high school education was 
state-wide; it did not relate to the local area, which 
may, or may not have, been exceptional. It also 
related only to males, which may, or may not have 
been, typical. Even less certain was the evidence 
regarding the tests. The Court in Griggs relied on a 
single EEOC case that based its findings upon a 
“battery” of tests that merely included the two tests 
used in Griggs. Yet the Court in Griggs accepted 
that this evidence, in combination with the 
comparison of the workforce, formed the basis of a 
prima facie case. 
As far as the comparison is concerned, Griggs and 
Wards Cove, once undressed, are indistinguishable. 
The rejection in Wards Cove of the “in-house” 
comparison amounted to a rejection of Griggs itself. 
This part of Wards Cove is flawed because it is 
rooted in fault-based liability and a spurious fear of 
quotas; and under it, a case like Griggs could not 
succeed.  
The British Position on the Comparison 
In Britain, the new definition demands that the 
employment practice puts or would put persons of 
the protected group at a particular disadvantage 
when compared with other persons. The old 
definition stated that the comparison should be 
between those groups who “can comply.” This 
restricted the comparison to positive statistics. For 
example, in McCausland v Dungannon DC, this 
restricted the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal56 to 
comparing positive figures of 2.1 and 1.5 per cent. 
The new definition should allow the use of positive 
or negative figures, as appropriate.  
                                                          
55 490 US 642, at 674. Stevens, J (dissenting) cited the District 
Court hearing 34 EPD para 34,437, at 33,837-33,838. No credit 
either way was given to this evidence. 
56 By the Fair Employment (NI) Act 1976, which uses the same 
formula as RRA 1976. 
So far as the pool for comparison is concerned, the 
statutory guidance remains unaffected by the new 
formula for indirect discrimination. Section 3(4), 
RRA 1976 provides: 
“A comparison of the case of a person of a particular 
racial group with that of a person not of that group ... 
must be such that the relevant circumstances in the one 
case are the same, or not materially different, from the 
other.”57 
 
This does not restrict the comparison to any 
particular type of pool, and where appropriate, “in-
house” statistics should be acceptable. The issue of 
“in-house” statistics and quotas has not arisen in the 
context of the comparison in the UK. There is no 
rule of law why this should be, but it could be put 
down to procedure. The British courts, save in 
redundancy cases, normally accept a theoretical 
comparison, rather than a real one. This is because 
real comparisons are impracticable and expensive to 
make. In the United States most disparate impact 
cases are class actions, often lasting many years; 
these justify extensive analysis of the impact of 
various business practices. In the UK class actions 
are much less common.58 Usually, individuals bring 
claims of indirect discrimination, although the 
Commission for Racial Equality or the Equal 
Opportunities Commission support some claims if it 
considers that this may be of general benefit.59  
The Fundamental Flaw of the Quota Fear 
The fundamental reason that recognising these 
“plantation economy” cases will not lead to quotas is 
rooted in the symmetrical nature of most anti-
discrimination legislation,60 which is based on 
equality, between ethnic minorities and whites, 
women and men. So, legislation primarily aimed at 
protecting and benefiting, say, African-Americans, 
equally protects and benefits whites, and so on and 
so forth. Thus the adoption of quotas - which would 
disfavour, say, whites, or men - would be unlawful, 
and may amount to intentional disparate treatment 
(direct discrimination), which often will result in 
higher damages, and so be an even more expensive 
option. This argument applies to legislation in both 
jurisdictions. In the United States, in some 
                                                          
57 The relevant provisions for discrimination on the grounds of 
sex, sexual orientation and religion are materially the same.  
58 For a discussion on the UK position see Pannick, D, Sex 
Discrimination Law, 1985, Oxford: OUP, pp 284–301. 
59  See, for instance, Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 2 AC 548 HL. 
There is also a body of case law where domestic legislation has 
been challenged (often by the European Commission) for being 
incompatible with European Union sex discrimination law. 
Normally, as with Dothard v Rawlinson (see above) these 
challenges are based upon national statistics. 
60 Exceptions to this principle include pregnancy, disability, and 
affirmative action. 
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circumstances, quotas may be unconstitutional as 
well.61 
Reasons in Favour of Recognising Plantation 
Economy Cases 
So far, we have seen that there are no legal reasons 
why recognising the plantation economy cases 
would lead to quotas. In addition, there are number 
of positive reasons why these cases should be 
recognised. First, the alternative is to do nothing, 
which should not be an option for a 21st century 
civilisation. Second, studies have shown that 
discrimination causes inefficiencies.62 As a matter of 
common sense, if business practices are tainted by 
race, gender or any irrelevancies, the employer can 
hardly tell the shareholders that the business is one-
hundred per cent efficient. Third, as Lustgarten 
noted, the more the law can strike down barriers 
such as discriminatory and unnecessary selection 
criteria, in Great Britain at least, with its small ethnic 
minority population,63 in purely numerical terms, 
more unqualified whites stand to benefit than those 
minorities at whom the legislation principally is 
aimed.64 Fourth, the spur to employers to review 
their practices more carefully would lead to less 
discrimination. Fifth, the employer is better placed 
than anybody to identify the cause(s) of any 
significant disparity within its workforce. 
Reform 
The reform required in the United States is the 
abolition of section 105, Civil Rights Act 1991. This 
would leave the phrase “employment practice” in 
Title VII. Courts would then be left to evaluate 
whatever evidence is presented when deciding if a 
plaintiff has a prima facie case. If it is sufficient to 
raise an inference of a discriminatory practice 
(which it should have been in Wards Cove), then the 
employer should be obliged to justify the situation. 
This will spur employers to monitor the profile of 
their workforces, and where signs of discrimination 
are apparent (as in Griggs and Wards Cove), review 
their employment practices and in doing so, identify 
the cause(s) of the disparity, as well as perhaps, 
justify it, or part of it. Note that in practice, this extra 
burden on employers is non-legal, and should reduce 
                                                          
61 See eg Wygant v Jackson Board of Education 476 US 267 
(1986). 
62 For an extensive study of business efficiency and Title VII see 
Greenberger, S, “A Productivity approach to Disparate Impact 
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991” 72 Oregon Law Rev 253 
(1993). Contrast Epstein, R, Forbidden Grounds: The Case 
Against Employment Discrimination Laws (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press 1992), esp pp 226-229. 
63 Estimated at 7.1% in mid-2000: Social Trends, 2002 , No 32, 
London: HMSO, Table 1.4, p 30. The estimate includes the 
Black, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Chinese groups. Great 
Britain excludes Northern Ireland. 
64 Lustgarten, L, Legal Control of Racial Discrimination, 1980, 
London: Macmillan Press, p 9. 
litigation. No legislative reform is necessary in the 
United Kingdom, although such reform would help 
clarify matters. Under the new definition, courts 
should, where appropriate, be able take the same 
approach and draw an inference of a discriminatory 
employment practice from significant “in-house” 
statistics.  
Conclusion 
Courts in the United States have always recognised 
subjective hiring practices except where the 
employer merely acquiesces in the practice. But this 
exception has developed in neglect of tortious 
liability for omissions, and vicariously liability and 
means that an employer merely can watch his 
workers engage in discriminatory practices and 
escape liability. Such a distinction is legally 
unsound, against the policy of the legislation, and 
brings the law into disrepute. In the United 
Kingdom, the reversal of Perera v Civil Service 
Commission65 by the new definition of indirect 
discrimination opens the way for subjective hiring 
practices to be challenged. There is no reason why 
the courts should develop an exception for mere 
acquiescence.   
Recognising plantation economy cases will not 
lead to quotas because: (1) the symmetrical nature of 
the legislation, renders quotas unlawful, leaving an 
employer to face even more litigation; (2) 
demanding that the plaintiff isolates a causal specific 
employment practice does nothing to prevent the 
adoption of quotas, if anything, the element of 
justification fulfils this role; (3) the element of 
justification may help identify internal and external 
causes of racial (or other) stratification; (4) “in-
house” statistics may be used without causing 
quotas, and indeed were used in Griggs v Duke 
Power. In addition, we have seen that under Wards 
Cove, there is likely to be more litigation. In addition 
there are policy reasons why these cases should be 
recognised.   
In Britain, plantation economy cases should be 
recognised under the new definition of indirect 
discrimination. However, claimants should argue 
carefully to prevent spurious reasoning leading to a 
misplaced quota fear.  
                                                          
65 [1983] ICR 428 CA. 
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